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13 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ORR/D/M
SUBJECT : Harassment in Cloud Gap 9

1. In the event that the USSR decided to carry out harassment of Western disarmament inspection teams in the Soviet Union, a large number of possibilities are open to them. They have considerable experience with such activities both within the USSR and abroad. These activities may amount to anything from mild obstruction to blatant counterintelligence entrapment, depending on the goals set by the Soviets and the extent to which they are willing to try our patience.

2. If the Soviets agree to undertake disarmament enforced by inspection, it cannot be assumed that they would throw the country open to us. Rather, it should be expected that they will adhere to the absolute letter of the agreement and apply stringent controls to see that we do not overstep the bounds of the agreement. This policy would be most in keeping with Soviet behavior with respect to other agreements. Therefore, the Soviets would probably effect harassment in such a way that it could be readily attributed to lower echelon inefficiency, misunderstanding, ignorance, over-enthusiasm, accident, and other human failings which are unusually prevalent in the USSR. At higher levels, the Soviets would maintain a solemn and convincing pretense that harassment was not their policy, and would make a show of concern about the cumulative hindrance of our inspection teams.

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3. While the Soviets could not completely thwart our inspection capability, they could introduce enough confusion into it to raise questions about the validity of findings. They would assuredly prevent our collecting information on weapon systems and components not included in the inspection scheme. Their expressed intention of doing this would be a valuable adjunct to their over-all harassment plan, as certain evasive and time-consuming actions which they undertook could be attributed openly to Soviet national security requirements. The ultimate goals of Soviet harassment would be to reduce the amount of effective time inspectors spend in an inspection area and intensify their reactions to frustrating and confusing environmental and artificial stimuli to the point where they no longer could be depended on for precise and straightforward inspection data. We do not believe that the Soviets would resort to outright falsification of data, but that evasion would consist instead of establishing an incorrect production flow and rate pattern, misleading inspectors as to the number of workers involved, the hours worked, and the number of items approved for use.

4. Attached is a list of harassment techniques we would expect the Soviets to use against Western inspection teams.

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